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I ARTICLES I
A Right to Treatment for AIDS Patients?
Neil L. Albert*
I. Introduction
This Article addresses a problem that does not exist - yet. De-
spite the well-publicized refusals of a few physicians to treat patients
afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), these
are isolated instances. Currently, most individuals with the AIDS vi-
rus are able to obtain medical attention. However, this situation may
not continue. As of June 1987, at least 1.5 million people in the
United States tested positive for the AIDS virus.' Further, the num-
ber of active AIDS cases is increasing at an unknown but rapid rate.
One biophysicist recently predicted an annual United States AIDS-
related death rate of 50,000 persons within the next few years.
More importantly, fear of the disease, both inside and outside the
medical community, is growing even faster than the disease itself. If
the number of active AIDS cases grows as rapidly as scientists fear,
will the medical community continue to deliver care, or will this seg-
ment of our society desperately in need of medical treatment be shut
but?
For the purpose of this Article, the term "AIDS victims" is
used in the broadest possible sense. The topic of this Article is not
limited to treatment of AIDS specifically, but includes any medical
treatment administered to a person carrying the AIDS virus. In ad-
* Partner, Zimmerman, Pfannebecker & Nuffort, Lancaster, PA. B.S. 1972, M.S. 1973,
University of Oregon; J.D. 1976, Villanova Law School. President, Lancaster County Chapter
of the American Civil Liberties Union.
1. Farber and Kaplan, The AIDS Epidemic: Neglected Issues, 155 THE JOURNAL OF
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1907 (1987) [hereinafter Farber and Kaplan].
2. American Medical News, Nov. 20, 1987, at 28. To put such a statistic in perspective,
American fatalities in Vietnam numbered approximately 58,000 over a twelve year period.
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dition, the term "AIDS victim" includes not only those with active
AIDS, but also those who are presently healthy but whose blood se-
rum is positive for the AIDS virus antibodies.
Society should not be complacent because of the encouraging
response of the medical profession to date. As time passes, the rea-
sons for the initially positive response begin to disappear. In the
early years after AIDS was first identified, cases were confined
mostly to a few large hospitals in large urban centers. As a new
disease, AIDS attracted the attention of infectious disease special-
ists, oncologists, academic physicians, and other highly motivated
medical researchers,' many of whom assumed that a cure would be
forthcoming.4 Times have changed, however; and as the novelty of
the disease has disappeared, the specialists have become less inter-
ested-especially since no cure appears to be available in the near
future. 5 The medical community now regards the general practi-
tioner rather than the infectious disease specialist as the appropriate
primary treating physician, at least for outpatient care.' Although
AIDS is still limited largely to certain high risk groups, the disease
has spread geographically, and every state has documented cases.
The burden of inpatient care no longer falls exclusively on a few
urban public hospitals. Private hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes
now find themselves in the forefront of the battle against the disease.
This combination of circumstances has thrust the burden of care for
AIDS patients upon a completely different segment of the health
care community-a segment that may not be as highly motivated as
the initial group of researchers and specialists.
Despite the approximately 50,000 acutely ill AIDS patients that
have been treated by tens of thousands of health care personnel, less
than half a dozen AIDS-positive blood serum test results have been
reported by the treating personnel; and none of the individuals has
yet developed any active AIDS symptoms. 7 If the feared number of.




7. Joint Advisory Notice: Department of Labor/Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices; HBV/HIB, 52 Fed. Reg 41818 (Oct. 30, 1987) [hereinafter Joint Advisory Notice];
Weiss, et al, HTLV-111 Infection Among Health Care Workers, 254 J.A.M.A. 2089 (Oct. 19,
1985). Interestingly, the cases of apparent occupational exposure have not involved needle-
sticks, but rather the transfer of significant amounts of liquid blood. Several studies have
shown no seroconversions from needlesticks. In the study mentioned above, thirty-nine subjects
reported at least one needlestick from a contaminated needle, with no transfer of the virus. Id.
See also Geberding, Risk of Transmitting the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Cytome-
galovirus, and Hepatitis B to Health Care Workers Exposed to Patient with AIDS and
AIDS-Related Conditions, 156 J. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (July 1987) (270 workers reported
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AIDS cases materializes, however, it is inevitable that a doctor,
nurse, or medical technician will eventually contract the AIDS virus
from an infected patient. When this happens, some health care
workers will panic; and it will be useless to point out to them that
they are at far greater risk of death from automobile accidents,
lightning strikes, or even falls in a bathtub. No one wants to die; and
in fearing death (no matter how unreasonable that fear may be), a
person's courage and sense of professional responsibility may prove
insufficient. Effective treatment of AIDS patients turns on surmount-
ing this somewhat illogical, but nonetheless very persistent, fear.
II. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome - A Medical Update
A. Identification, Diagnosis, and Transmission of the Disease
Confusion and misunderstanding concerning AIDS is wide-
spread among the general population, and the disease is imperfectly
understood even by researchers. Before turning to the legal issues
surrounding the AIDS virus, it is necessary to briefly review the pre-
sent state of scientific understanding of the disease.
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, or AIDS, is caused by
a retrovirus identified as T-lymphotropic virus type III/lymphade-
nopathy-associated virus.8 The name is usually abbreviated HTLV-
III/LAV. As the name suggests, the virus usually attacks a type of
white blood cell known as T-lymphocytes, which form an essential
component of the immune system.9 Severe interference with the nor-
mal operation of the T-lymphocyte cells disables the immune system
and leaves the victim vulnerable to opportunistic infections, espe-
cially various forms of pneumonia and certain types of cancer.' ° Re-
searchers have suggested that the virus also attacks the brain di-
342 accidental exposures with no seropositive reactions); McEvoy, Prospective Study of
Clinical, Laboratory and Ancillary Staff with Accidental Exposures to Blood or Bodily
Fluids from Patients Infected with HIV, 294 Brit. Med. J. 1595 (150 exposures with no ser-
oconversions). One case of seroconversion by a surgeon performing a bone marrow transplant,
during which a tube filled with infected blood pierced the surgeon's finger has been reported.
All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 18, 1988) [hereinafter All
Things Considered]. The broadcast was ambiguous concerning whether the physician had de-
veloped active AIDS. Id.
8. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Assisting in the Prevention of
Perinatal Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-Asso-
ciated Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 721 (Dec. 6, 1985).
9. Id. at 721-22.
10. Rothenberg, Woelfel, Stoneburner, lberg, Parker, and Truman, Survival with the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1297 (Nov. 19, 1987) [here-
inafter Rothenberg].
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rectly, either in conjunction with, or instead of, attacking the
immune system. Such an attack produces a condition known as
AIDS-induced dementia."
At the present time, the medical community uses two tests for
the AIDS virus.12 Neither test is highly reliable,' 8 and neither de-
tects the presence of the virus directly. Instead, both test blood se-
rum for the presence of antibodies produced in response to the pres-
ence of the AIDS virus.' 4 The easiest test to employ is the Enzyme-
Linked Immunosorbent Assay. This test, more commonly known as
ELISA, is used as an initial test and for screening large popula-
tions.' 5 Because the ELISA test results in many false positive reac-
tions-as high as eighty-five percent false positive results in low risk
populations16-the Centers for Disease Control recommend that a
positive result should not be confirmed unless the patient also tests
positive to the second test, known as the Western blot test.' 7 A posi-
tive Western blot test is still not conclusive, however, because ten
percent of the Western blot positives are false.' 8 Even more discon-
certing, five percent of the negative Western blot results are false.'"
Individuals whose blood serum displays a positive reaction to
the AIDS antibody on repeated ELISA tests and the Western blot
test are referred to as being "seropositive.' '2 0 Scientists currently be-
lieve that most conversions to seropositive occur within two to four
months of exposure, although a few cases have been claimed as late
as six months after exposure. 2 ' At the present time, seroconversion
more than four months after exposure generally is not considered
scientifically proven.2
Ii. F. Gyorkey, Melnick and P. Gyorkey, Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Brain Bi-
opsies of Patients with AIDS and Progressive Encephalopathy, 155 J. OF INFECTIOuS Dis-
EASES 870 (May 1987).
12. Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin and Fineberg, Compulsory Premarital
Screening for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J.A.M.A. 1757 (Oct. 2, 1987) [herein-
after Cleary].
13. Id. at 1759-60. In one study, only fifteen percent of persons with positive ELISA test
results were actually infected. Id.
14. Id. at 1758.
15. Id.
16. All Things Considered, supra note 7; see also supra note 14.
17. Joint Advisory Notice, supra note 7, at 41820.
18. All Things Considered, supra note 7.
19. Id. See also Cleary, supra note 12, at 1759-60.
20. Centers for Disease Control, Summary: Recommendations for Preventing Transmis-
sion of Infection with Human T-Lymphotrophic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associ-
ated Virus in the Workplace, 34 (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep.) 681 (Nov. 15, 1985)
[hereinafter Summary].
21. Id. at 685-86.
22. Joint Advisory Notice, supra note 7, at 41820.
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The period following exposure but before seroconversion is often
referred to as the "AIDS window." 23 During this interval, the indi-
vidual has no way of knowing whether he carries the virus, yet he
may be contagious. Since the tests presently used cannot detect the
virus, they are only useful after the virus has incubated for a suffi-
cient period of time for the antibodies to appear. 4 A test that is
directly sensitive to the virus, instead of the antibodies, would elimi-
nate the AIDS "window." 25
Current scientific data indicates that the AIDS virus is spread
in basically the same manner as the HBV virus, which is responsible
for hepatitis B in humans." In fact, the Centers for Disease Control
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
recommend identical precautions against both diseases.2 7 The viruses
are spread through the exchange of bodily fluids during sexual con-
tact, transfusions with contaminated blood, or by sharing contami-
nated needles. 28 Needlestick injuries are the most common mode of
transmission of HBV virus to health care personnel. The HTLV-III/
LAV virus poses a much smaller risk of infection following a need-
lestick than the HBV virus.29 The risk of acquiring hepatitis B from
an infected person via a needlestick injury ranges from six percent to
thirty percent, depending upon the virulence of the infection; while
the risk of acquiring AIDS from a needlestick is less than one per-
cent and may even be nonexistent.30 Although several thousand
health care workers in this country become ill with hepatitis B each
year, and about three hundred die annually,3 only a limited number
of unambiguous cases of seroconversion in health care workers after
exposure to the AIDS virus have been documented to date.32




26. Summary, supra note 20, at 682-83.
27. Joint Advisory Notice, supra note 7, at 41819.
28. Id. at 41819.
29. Id. at 41818. Even before the discovery of AIDS, the practice of medicine involved
personal risk to the physician. Thousands of American physicians in this century succumbed to
occupationally-contracted cholera, diptheria, polio, influenza, and other infectious diseases. At
the present time, more than 18,000 American health care workers become ill with hepatitis B
each year, and nearly ten percent of those persons become carriers of the disease and may
have to give up their profession. It is interesting to note that a vaccine against hepatitis B is
available, but the majority of health care institutions do not immunize their employees because
of the cost of the vaccine-approximately $150 for a three-shot series.
30. Id. at 41819.
31. Id. at 41818.
32. Id. According to the Centers for Disease Control, less than one percent of health
care workers in an HIV-risk environment have contracted the virus via a needlestick injury. Id.
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lated in the tears, saliva, and breast milk of some AIDS patients,
there are no known cases of infection from these sources.3 3 The virus
is easily destroyed outside the body by a one-tenth solution of ordi-
nary household bleach. 4 A 1986 study of 101 persons living in
households with AIDS patients found no instance of virus transmis-
sion through normal household contact. This study is especially
noteworthy because most of the households were extremely impover-
ished and had very low standards of hygiene.3 6 Contact between the
members of these households was often more intimate than in middle
class households and far closer than the contact between co-work-
ers.87 For example, many of the children reported sharing a bed with
an infected parent or other adult. Half of the household members
shared combs with the infected person and fifteen percent shared
clothing."
The AIDS virus is frequently transmitted by sexual contact.
Anal intercourse is a relatively efficient means of transmitting the
disease because of the extensive vascularization of the rectum and
the possibility of tearing small blood vessels.3 9 By contrast, vaginal
intercourse is a far less efficient vehicle for transmission of the vi-
rus.40 Transmission by oral-genital contact is very unlikely, partly
because of the highly acidic nature of the stomach fluids."'
The term "having AIDS" is used loosely to describe the entire
course of the disease and is very imprecise. The first stage is the
determination that the individual is seropositive for the AIDS virus.
At this point, the individual's immune system is under attack but
continues to function. The individual is capable of transmitting the
virus to others, however, even though he shows no clinical symp-
33. Id. Only blood and blood products, semen, vaginal secretions, and possibly breast
milk have been directly linked to transmission of the HIV virus.
34. Id. at 41820-22; see also Summary, supra note 20, at 692.
35. Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers and Klein, Lack of Transmis-
sion of HTLV-Ill/LAV Infection to Household Contacts of Patients With AIDS or AIDS-
Related Complex With Oral Candiasis, 34 NEW ENG. J. MED. 344 (1986) [hereinafter
Friedland].
36. Id. The subjects in the study lived at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Sixty-
five percent had a household income below $10,000. At least seventy-five percent of the AIDS
patients were intravenous drug users. The households also reported sharing such items as nail-
clippers, razors, and even toothbrushes. As one might expect in any household, most reported
sharing bathrooms, kitchens, drinking glasses, and eating plates and utensils. Id. at 346.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Gould, Reassuring News About AIDS, COSMOPOLITAN, Nov. 1987, at 146-47.
40. Id. at 146. This holds true where there is penetration of a penis into a well-lubrica-
ted vagina and neither partner is unhealthy or has open sores. Id.
41. Id. at 147. There are no reported cases of AIDS transmission via cunnilingus or
fellatio. Id.
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toms.42 A critical but unresolved question is whether an individual
can remain in this first stage indefinitely or if the disease always
progresses to the point when disease symptoms appear.4 Early stud-
ies indicated that the vast majority of seropositive persons would not
develop active cases of the disease; more recent studies indicate that
this may not be true."" Although scientists know a great deal about
the transmission of AIDS, the means of controlling it, and its short
term effects, there is still a very limited understanding of the long
term dangers posed by the virus. Long-term survival of seropositive
persons who do not develop active AIDS does not necessarily indi-
cate that the virus will remain inactive. Rather, it may simply mean
that the lapse of time before the disease becomes active is very great.
Current research estimates that thirty to fifty percent of the persons
seropositive for the virus will develop active AIDS.45 Two years ago,
the figure was ten percent."' It is certainly within the realm of possi-
bility that most or even all seropositive patients will eventually de-
velop active AIDS."'
In the medical community, patients who are seropositive for the
AIDS virus and who also display some clinical sign of illness are
generally recognized as suffering from AIDS. According to criteria
developed by the Centers for Disease Control, this diagnosis involves
the unexplained presence of generalized lymphadenopathy persisting
for at least three months, plus two abnormal laboratory values relat-
ing to T-lymphocyte cells."8 The term ARC, or AIDS-related com-
plex, originally used to describe seropositive individuals with mild
clinical symptoms, does not have a generally accepted medical mean-
ing and is falling into disuse."9
The average survival time of a patient with active AIDS is
much longer today than it was several years ago.50 Scientists now
understand the process of the disease more fully and can respond
42. Joint Advisory Notice, supra note 7, at 41820.
43. See, e.g., El-Sadr, Marmor, Zolla-Pazner, Stahl, Lyden, William, D'Onofrio, Weiss
and Saxinger, Four Year Prospective Study of Homosexual Man, 155 J. OF INFECTIOUS Dis-
EASES 789 (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter EI-Sadr].
44. Id. See also Farber and Kaplan, supra note I.
45. Farber and Kaplan, supra note 1.
46. See School Bd. v. Bd. of Ed., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 400, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (1986).
47. Rothenberg, supra note 10.
48. Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 32
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 389 (1982).
49. Speech by Stephen Kustera, M.D., to a joint meeting of the Lancaster County Med-
ical Society and Bar Association (November 1987). Medical opinion now appears to be moving
toward the view that "ARC" describes nothing more than a mild case of AIDS. The frequency
of the use of "ARC" has declined precipitously in medical literature since 1986. Id.
50. Rothenberg, supra note 10, at 1297-1301.
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with more appropriate symptomatic treatment."' The increasing sur-
vival period may also be a function of earlier diagnosis of the dis-
ease. Early AIDS patients in America were primarily intravenous
drug users with a low general standard of health,52 and many did not
present themselves for treatment until they were extremely ill with
end-stage complications of the disease.53 The average survival time
for such individuals was only six weeks from the date of diagnosis.5 '
By contrast, the largely homosexual population that later developed
the disease has, in general, tended to be better-nourished and have a
higher overall standard of health. The gay population is also gener-
ally more aware of the problem and more willing to seek prompt
treatment.5 5 Much longer survivals are now the rule, with an average
period of two years between diagnosis and death,5" and even longer
intervals are not unknown.
57
The longer survival rate hardly indicates progress towards cur-
ing or even managing the disease, however. In fact, this apparent
improvement is dismissed by some researchers as a statistical sleight
of hand. The earlier active AIDS is diagnosed, the earlier the clock
begins to run in measuring survival time. The survival interval for
early AIDS victims may have been so short because the disease was
active but undiagnosed for such an extended period of time.58
51. Id. at 1302.
52. Conversation with representative of the American Civil Liberties Union Gay and
Lesbian Rights Project (Nov. 18, 1987).
53. Id. This is also consistent with Rothenberg's findings. Rothenberg, supra note 10, at
1301.
54. Id. More than eleven percent of the persons in the sample were dead when the diag-
nosis was first made. Id.
55. Id. In the Rothenberg study, approximately fifteen percent of the AIDS patients
were still alive after five years. Even more significant, mortality after four years was the same
as after five years. Id. A five year survival of fifteen percent is hardly encouraging news; only
the most virulent forms of cancer rival this figure. However, it at least refutes the popular
notion that AIDS is invariably fatal within a short time.
56. Private interview with representative of New York American Civil Liberties Union
affiliate (Dec. 20, 1987).
57. Rothenberg, supra note 10. In a study of 5,833 AIDS cases in New York City be-
tween 1981 and 1985, the overall survival rate after one year was forty-nine percent; after five
years it was fifteen percent. The exact nature of the symptoms manifested strongly influence
survival, pneumonia being far more lethal than cancer. The authors of the study caution
against interpreting it to mean that AIDS is a survivable disease; some individuals were shown
as "surviving" because it could not be confirmed that they were dead (at the end of the study).
Id.
58. Id. The statistical issue involved is the same issue demonstrated in discussions of
cancer cures, where the test of a cure is five year survival from the date of diagnosis. Using
such criteria, early detection greatly increases the chances of a cure of some types of cancer,
such as breast cancer, because the individual is more likely to be alive five years after an early-
detected malignancy. A strong case can be made that early detection simply starts the five-
year clock running early. In fact, mortality from breast cancer has changed very little over the
years; the same proportion of people still die, but early detection allows reports that they sur-
TREATMENT FOR AIDS PATIENTS
B. Treatment for AIDS Patients
To date, treatment of active AIDS cases, other than supportive
and palliative measures, is purely experimental. 9 Based upon the
limited efficacy and serious side effects of currently available drugs
such as AZT, drug therapy can only be justified in light of the fatal
nature of the disease.60
Recently, researchers announced the possibility of blocking the
AIDS virus by injecting the host with genetic material that would
act as a "target" to the AIDS virus and decoy it away from its nor-
mal victim, the T-lymphocyte cells."1 Although this is an interesting
theoretical possibility, scientists are several years away from know-
ing whether AIDS blocking is an acceptable and effective treatment
for AIDS victims.
The feasibility of developing a vaccine against AIDS is difficult
to assess. HTLV-III/LAV is a retrovirus, 62 and one of the unique
capabilities of such a virus is the ability to change certain of its
characteristics within the body, allowing it to bypass the host's im-
mune system. Because of this characteristic, scientists have not de-
veloped a vaccine for a retrovirus. Further complicating matters,
some researchers claim to have identified several distinct strains of
the AIDS virus. It is probably safe to say that our society must plan
its response to the challenge of AIDS on the assumption that no vac-
cine will be available in the foreseeable future.
Attitude surveys confirm what most of us assume: physicians
tend to be less sympathetic towards AIDS patients and are more
likely to blame them for their condition. 3 Exposure to the possibility
vive their fifth anniversary of diagnosis. Parver, Defense of Delayed Diagnosis and Treatment
of Breast Cancer, MED. TRIAL TECHNIQUE Q. 34 (Summer 1983).
59. Richman, The Toxicity of AZT in the Treatment of Patients with AIDS and AIDS-
related Complex, 317 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 192 (1987).
60. Id. See also Regimen Alternating Two AIDS Drugs Found to Limit Negative Side
Effects, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 15, 1988, at 5.
61. Merz, Recombinant Protein May Block HIV Infection Process, 259 J.A.M.A. 463
(Jan. 22, 1988). See also Conant, Condoms Prevent Transmission of AIDS-Associated Re-
trovirus, 255 J.A.M.A. 1706 (Apr. 4, 1986).
62. Speech by Stephen Kustera, M.D., supra note 49.
63. Kelly, Stigmatization of AIDS Patients by Physicians, 77 AM. J. OF PUBLIC
HEALTH 789-91 (1987). In conversations with a number of health care providers in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, the author notes that their fear of AIDS has little to do with statistics regarding
the extreme unlikelihood of contracting the disease or with the doctor's specialty. The surgeons
and emergency room physicians want to be able to test for HIV but have no problem perform-
ing invasive procedures upon infected patients if they are able to take proper precautions.
Several general practitioners, dentists, and chiropractors expressed serious concern about treat-
ing patients with AIDS. By far the group with the greatest concern appeared to be the spouses
of physicians regardless of the specialty of the physician-spouse. Conversations with Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, physicians, dentists and spouses (1986-87).
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of death is a real fear, and physicians can hardly be blamed for
wanting to err on the side of caution in their care of patients with
this disease. There is also an economic element to the problem. Some
physicians are concerned about losing their non-AIDS patients if it
is discovered that they are willing to treat AIDS patients.6 Faced
with increasing numbers of patients suffering from a disease that
may be both incurable and inevitably fatal, our system of health care
delivery may falter.
These attitudes will undoubtedly harden as the AIDS epidemic
widens. If the present voluntary system begins to break down, what
are the legal rights of a patient with AIDS to obtain treatment?
What provisions has society made for medical and hospital care?
Are these provisions adequate and, if not, what should be done?
III. Legal Boundaries of the Physician/Patient Relationship in the
Treatment of AIDS
At common law, the legal relationship of the physician and pa-
tient was relatively simple. The relationship was based upon an im-
plied contract that the physician would use reasonable care and skill
and that the patient would pay the fair and reasonable value of the
services. 6 As in any contractual relationship, a key element was vol-
untariness. Either party could terminate the relationship. No person
could be compelled to employ a certain physician, and no physician
was required to accept a particular person as a patient.66
In order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens,
each state regulates the practice of medicine within its borders.6 7
This is achieved by requiring a state license as a precondition to the
practice of medicine and by establishing a medical licensing board to
ensure that the licensees meet state standards.68 Licensing statutes
and regulations of the medical licensing board set forth the qualifica-
tions for a license holder." In theory, medical licenses can be sus-
pended or revoked for many reasons. As a practical matter, however,
most disciplinary proceedings are based upon insurance fraud or
drug abuse, and the remaining disciplinary provisions are seldom
64. Id.
65. AM. JR.2D §§ 158-173 (1981).
66. Id. at § 158.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 422.22 (1985) (Pennsylvania requirements for issu-
ance of a license to practice medicine).
69. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. § 422.1 (1985) (Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act of
1985, which sets up the State Board of Medicine and regulates the practice of physicians).
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employed. 70
The Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act is a typical licensing
statute. Among other things, it sets forth "unprofessional or immoral
conduct" as grounds for professional discipline. 71 As the Common-
wealth's licensing authority, the Pennsylvania Medical Board has is-
sued regulations defining "unprofessional or immoral conduct" as in-
cluding the violation of a statute or regulation that imposes a
standard for the practice of medicine, abandoning a patient, and vio-
lation of regulations fixing a standard of conduct. 71
Although Pennsylvania has reported less than three percent of
the national AIDS cases, the Pennsylvania Medical Society has been
70. See, e.g., Maryland Survey Shows Doctors Rarely Lose Licenses, Lancaster Intelli-
gencer Journal, Jan. I1, 1988, at 3, col. 1. From 1968 through 1987, only 157 Maryland
doctors were disciplined and only eighteen lost their licenses. Of the eighteen revocations, only
two were based upon poor patient care. The rest involved convictions for Medicaid fraud, theft,
narcotics, and sex offenses. Id.
71. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 422.1. The Act provides:
Section 422.41. Reasons for refusal, revocation, suspension or other correc-
tive action against a licensee or certificate holder.
The Board shall have authority to impose disciplinary or corrective mea-
sures on a board-regulated practitioner for any or all of the following reasons:
(6) Violation of a lawful regulation promulgated by the Board, or
violation of a lawful order of the Board previously entered in a discipli-
nary proceeding; ...
(8) Being guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct. Unprofes-
sionaJ conduct shall include any departure from or failing to conform to
an ethical or quality standard of the profession. In proceedings based
upon this paragraph, actual injury to a patient need not be established.
(i) The ethical standards of a profession are those ethical ten-
ets which are embraced by the professional community in this
Commonwealth.
Id.
72. 49 PA. CODE § 16.61 (1987). Unprofessional and Immoral Conduct
(a) A physician who engages in unprofessional or immoral conduct is sub-
ject to disciplinary action under section 41 of the act (63 P.S. Section 422.41).
Unprofessional conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following: . . .
(2) Violating a statute, or a regulation adopted thereunder, which
imposes a standard for the practice of medicine in this Commonwealth.
The Board, in reaching a decision on whether there has been a violation
of a statute, rule or regulation, will be guided by adjudications of the
agency or court which administers or enforces the standard; ...
(17) Abandoning a patient. Abandonment occurs when a physician
withdraws his services after a physician-patient relationship has been es-
tablished, by failing to give notice to the patient of the physician's inten-
tion to withdraw in sufficient time to allow the patient to obtain necessary
medical care. Abandonment also occurs when a physician leaves the em-
ployment of a group practice, hospital, clinic, or other health care facility,
without the physician giving reasonable notice and under circumstances
which seriously impair the delivery of medical care to patients; . . .
(19) Violation of regulations fixing a standard of professional
conduct.
Id.
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in the forefront of developing policies to deal with the problem." At
its March 1987 meeting, the Board of Trustees of the Pennsylvania
Medical Society created a Task Force on AIDS, which submitted its
report to the House of Delegates at the Society's annual meeting on
October 23, 1987. 7  The Task Force recognized that AIDS presents
more than just a medical problem:
A major factor that makes AIDS different from other sexually-
transmitted diseases is the overwhelming social stigma attached
to a diagnosis of AIDS. Part of this stigma is due to widespread
misunderstanding of how HIV is transmitted. The common per-
ception that casual contact puts an individual at risk for infec-
tion is not borne out by current clinical evidence. However, such
misunderstanding and fear are not easily overcome by scientific
arguments. As long as the public fears causal contact with HIV-
infected persons, these individuals, regardless of how they were
exposed to the virus, will be subjected to discrimination and
ostracism.7"
On October 25, 1987, the Pennsylvania Medical Society House
of Delegates adopted the recommendations of the Task Force as its
official AIDS policy. 6 Although many of the recommendations re-
late to testing and confidentiality issues, the policy contains two im-
portant provisions concerning the right to treatment. First, every
HIV-infected person, including those with AIDS, should have access
to compassionate and competent medical care in Pennsylvania. Sec-
ond, physicians should participate in government efforts to develop
anti-discrimination policies designed to protect the rights of those af-
flicted with AIDS or infected with HIV.
77
Based solely upon this policy, the Pennsylvania Medical Board
would have a difficult time finding a basis for disciplinary action
against a physician for refusing to treat an AIDS patient because
the policy fails to recognize an unambiguous right to treatment. The
73. Pennsylvania Medical Society, PMS Policy on AIDS: Rationale from PMS Task
Force on AIDS Report Submitted to the PMS House of Delegates October 23, 1987, at 3. As
of August 26, 1987, Pennsylvania ranked seventh highest in number of reported AIDS cases
with 1,020 cases. Of those persons, sixty-two percent have died. Homosexual activity was re-
sponsible for transmission in seventy-two percent of the cases and drug use for nine percent. A
combination of the two factors accounted for another eight percent and the remaining eleven
percent resulted from transfusions, heterosexual contact, and prenatal infection of children
born to infected mothers. The study reported no cases of occupational exposure. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 4.
76. Pennsylvania Medical Society Policy on AIDS (adopted by the PMS House of Del-
egates on Oct. 25, 1987).
77. Id.
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document is phrased in terms of what an AIDS patient should be
able to expect, not what the physician has an obligation to do. Ar-
guably, a physician would be justified in saying that the policy ex-
presses a hope but does not impose a duty. The Medical Society did
not unequivocally say that it is unethical to refuse treatment to an
AIDS patient, but it could have easily done so. Since it did not, it
appears that a physician is free to make his own judgments.
IV. Analysis of American Medical Association Guidelines Con-
cerning the Treatment of AIDS Patients
Although the Pennsylvania Medical Society has an ethics com-
mittee, it has not yet set its own ethical standards. In fact, its ethics
committee has not met in the last five years. 8 Instead, Pennsylvania
follows the practice of many state medical societies in adopting the
ethical standards of the American Health Association (AMA).7
The AMA has adopted specific guidelines concerning the treat-
ment of AIDS patients.8" The relevant document is the Report of the
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, which was accepted by the
AMA House of Delegates at the Interim Meeting in Atlanta in De-
cember of 1987.81 The Report imposes a clear duty of treatment
upon physicians:
A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose
condition is within the physician's current realm of competence
solely because the patient is seropositive. The tradition of the
American Medical Association, since its organization in 1847, is
that, when an epidemic prevails, a physician must continue his
labors without regard to the risk to his own health. That tradi-
tion must be maintained. A person who is afflicted with AIDS
78. Telephone interview with representative of Pennsylvania Medical Society (Nov.
1987).
79. In a survey of medical societies conducted by the author in December, 1987, twenty-
one of the twenty-four respondents indicated that they adopted AMA ethical standards as
their own.
80. Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical As-
sociation, Ethical Issues in the Growing AIDS Crisis.
81. Id. At its meeting in November, 1987, prior to the AMA meeting, the Texas Medi-
cal Association adopted a report of its Board of Counselors that physicians may decline to
treat AIDS patients but they are ethically responsible to undertake and continue the care of
such patients until the patient can be transferred to the care of another physician. The TMA's
position does not involve a question of licensure since the Texas medical licensing authority
does not suspend licenses for violations of professional ethics, despite the apparent authority to
do so as "improper or dishonorable conduct" in the licensure statute. TMA Policy Lets MDs
Refuse AIDS Patients if They Refer, Am. Med. News, Dec. 4, 1987, at 3, 39; telephone
conversation with counsel for Texas Medical Association (Dec. 21, 1987). Six of the medical
societies responding to the author's survey indicated that violating the state ethical standard
would not be a matter for the licensure board. See supra note 79.
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needs competent, compassionate treatment. Neither those who
have the disease nor those who have been infected with the virus
should be subjected to discrimination based on fear or prejudice,
least of all by members of the health care community. Physi-
cians should respond to the best of their abilities in cases of
emergency where first aid treatment is essential, and physicians
should not abandon patients whose care they have undertaken.8"
The intent of the American Medical Association in accepting
this report could not be more clear. The AMA has taken a strong
stance in favor of the rights of those afflicted with AIDS. The signifi-
cance of the AMA's action is not to set the scene for the collection
of "scalps" from physicians-the importance is moral rather than
punitive. The AMA seeks to set a moral, social, and ethical stan-
dard. Its position on AIDS gives the pro-treatment argument a legit-
imacy and authority within the medical profession that it cannot
achieve in any other way.
The AMA's position has important legal consequences, even to
non-member physicians. Most major hospitals require compliance
with AMA standards, including ethical principles, for a physician to
hold staff privileges at the hospital.8" A doctor without staff privi-
leges at a local hospital is seriously compromised professionally. Fur-
ther, a number of states, including Pennsylvania, deem AMA ethical
standards to be the state standard of medical practice.8 In those
states that provide for discipline because of professional misconduct,
the AMA standard becomes the state standard of conduct required
for licensure. 85 In theory, a physician who refuses to treat an AIDS
patient under these circumstances faces the possibility of suspension
82. Id. (citations omitted). The report goes on to say:
Principle VI of the 1980 Principles of Medical Ethics states that "[a] physi-
cian shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be
free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate and the environment in
which to provide medical services." The Council has always interpreted this
Principle as not supporting illegal or invidious discrimination. Thus, it is the
view of the Council that Principle VI does not permit categorical discrimination
against a patient based solely upon his or her seropositivity. A physician who is
not able to provide the services required by persons with AIDS should make an
appropriate referral to those physicians of facilities that are equipped to provide
such services.
Id. (citations omitted).
83. See Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Ameri-
can Medical Association § 8.10 (available from the A.M.A.).
84. See author's survey, supra note 79. Several states (such as South Dakota, New
Hampshire and New Jersey) which do not automatically follow AMA standards, are establish-
ing their own AIDS policies.
85. Id; see also 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 422.41 (1985) (reasons for license revocation).
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or loss of his license.86
Application of the American Medical Association's decision will
vary from state to state. Where the state medical society sets its own
ethical rules, such as Texas, the AMA decision is merely advisory.
Even if the state medical society considers the AMA's position to be
binding, the state licensure board might not have statutory authority
to discipline a physician for unethical practice.88 Furthermore, the
licensing board may not wish to use its powers in such a situation.89
The AMA approach can be challenged as imperfect in at least
three respects. First, although the impact of this action is great, it is
not really national for the reasons discussed above. Fortunately, this
objection is more philosophical than practical. Although the spread
of AIDS has been somewhat geographical, it mainly has been lat-
eral, that is, deeper into the same high risk groups in the same geo-
graphic areas. The degree of geographic concentration of the disease
is remarkable, as should be anticipated with a disease that is not
communicated by casual contact. Only 280 of the more than 6,000
acute care hospitals nationwide reported seventy-five percent of all
AIDS cases." Even though New York City contains only three per-
cent of the national population, it contains twenty-seven percent of
the AIDS cases.91 The disease is highly concentrated within the
city.92 In some blocks, one male in twelve has active AIDS; on ad-
joining blocks the ratio is one in 273.93 Areas reporting 60-105
AIDS cases per 10,000 people are directly adjacent to areas report-
ing one to four ratios.94 New York, New Jersey, Florida and Califor-
nia report the vast majority of AIDS cases.95 If the AMA position
was binding on physicians in only those four states, seventy to eighty
percent of the persons likely to contract AIDS would be protected. 96
The second objection to the AMA approach is that it leaves a
loophole open to medical personnel. A physician can claim that he
refused to treat based on his best medical judgment that he was "not
able to provide the services required." In most cases, a physician will





90. Summary, supra note 20, at 691.
91. New York City Maps the Destruction of AIDS, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, at I.
92. Id. at 58.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Speech by Stephen Kustera, supra note 49.
96. Id.
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suspicious assume that the reviewing board, composed partly of phy-
sicians and certainly having some sympathy for the medical profes-
sion, will emasculate the standard by accepting all such excuses or
by declining to investigate instances of treatment refusal altogether.
Response to this objection is threefold. First, society recognizes
the highly technical nature of medicine and allows broad powers of
self-regulation to the medical community in the form of peer review,
utilization review committees, and other types of internal monitor-
ing. No matter how imperfectly it works in practice, self-regulation
has been our traditional social means of policing the learned profes-
sions. Second, the objection is premature. If the AMA standard is
found to be inadequately enforced, society can address the problem
at that time. AIDS presents the medical profession with a sense of
personal risk that it has not faced since the outbreak of cholera and
typhoid. It is simply too soon to say whether treatment refusal will
become a significant social problem. Finally, one can question
whether this is indeed a loophole at all. Does society really want to
compel a physician to attempt treatment in every case? AIDS can
manifest itself in dozens of secondary conditions such as cancer,
pneumonia, renal failure, blood disorders, skin lesions, and brain
dysfunction.97 No single physician can treat all these problems. They
must be allowed to make good faith referrals in appropriate cases as
a matter of good medical policy.
The third weakness in the AMA approach is the practical prob-
lem of implementation. How should the right to treatment be exer-
cised financially? AIDS is an expensive disease that requires inten-
sive treatment and many patients are unable to afford care.98 Some
patients are indigent at the time they become actively ill, as in the
case of many IV drug users; some exhaust their medical insurance
and their financial resources during the course of the disease.99 This
problem will almost certainly worsen if insurance companies are per-
mitted to exclude seropositive persons from coverage. The AMA is
silent on whether a physician may decline to treat an AIDS patient
based upon inability to pay. As a matter of general law, a physician
is no more required to work for free than is a plumber. An examina-
tion of the financial plight of AIDS victims is beyond the scope of
this Article. It is questionable, however, whether AIDS patients
97. Rothenberg, supra note 10, at 1298-1302.
98. Private Hospital to Treat AIDS, Closes After Loss of $8 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec.
13, 1987, at 58, col. 4.
99. Id.
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might have won the ethical victory but still have lost the financial
war.
V. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as a Source of Federal Protec-
tion for AIDS Victims
If federal protection for AIDS victims exists at all, the most
likely source is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.100 A clear under-
standing of the background of the Act is essential to appreciate the
legal issues involved in protecting AIDS victims from discrimination.
Federal interest in rehabilitation began in a small way following
World War I, based largely on public sympathy for returning veter-
ans suffering from service-connected disabilities." 1 On June 2, 1920,
President Woodrow Wilson signed the Smith-Fess Act, which pro-
vided certain training, counseling, and job placement services for the
disabled.102 Even in its limited form, the statute represented a great
leap forward. Earlier versions of the bill had limited coverage to vet-
erans with service-connected disabilities. 10 The concept of a federal
program open to all of the nation's disabled, fifteen years before So-
cial Security, was a bold step for the time.
Enactment of the Social Security Act and related social legisla-
tion, and an absence of politically active handicapped persons at a
national level, delayed amendment of the Rehabilitation Act until
1943.10" The amendments broadened the law somewhat by providing
coverage for disabilities caused by mental as well as physical illness
and by providing medical and rehabilitative services necessary to re-
duce disability. 10 5 Minor changes in financing were made in 1954
and 1965,106 and financial and administrative reforms took place in
1967 without substantively changing the nature of the services
provided.1
0 7
In 1968, further amendment of the law modestly expanded cov-
erage to include follow-up services after job placement to aid the
newly-hired disabled employee in retaining his job.10 8 The 1968
100. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973).
101. S. REP. No. 93-318, 93rd Congress, Ist Session, July 16, 1973 (reported in 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 2076 (1973)).
102. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 101, at 2082.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2085.
106. Id. at 2083.
107. Id. at 2084.
108. Id. P.L. 90-341 (68).
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amendment also provided services to the families of the disabled."'
Foreshadowing the Act of 1973, the 1968 law included measures to
create employment for the disabled, unlike former policies that ex-
pected the disabled to fit themselves into the workforce."'
Had Woodrow Wilson been alive in 1970, he would have had no
trouble recognizing the philosophy and scope of the federal rehabili-
tation system. Although the programs of the original Smith-Fess Act
had expanded, the government's vocational orientation was un-
changed. The outlook of the federal rehabilitation program involved
a cost-benefit analysis, rather than a recognition that society owed
something to the disabled as a class. Persons too disabled to work
received rehabilitation to enable them to return to work and become
economically contributing members of society."'
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 broke some new ground but can
best be understood as an extension of the existing fifty year federal
policy. The Act was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The leg-
islative history shows that Congress was concerned not with embark-
ing in new experiments in social policy, but simply with making the
existing ones more efficient. For example, much of the criticism of
existing legislation concerned disparity in treatment: much was done
for the least disabled while persons with the most severe problems
were ignored."' Congress wanted to ensure that existing programs
penetrated to the most severely impaired, even those who would be
incapable of working after rehabilitation. 3
Until the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, federal legislation used
the term "disabled" to describe the population being serviced." 4 The
use of that term is revealing. "Disabled" connotes a disability from
something: in the minds of the legislators, disability from work. The
focus was on removal of the disability so the person would be able to
work. The only criteria for success of the pre-1973 programs was the
number of people that returned to the work force."' Starting in
1973, Congress shifted to use of the word "handicapped," a broader
and more general term. 16 As the drafters of the Act appreciated, a
person can be handicapped without being disabled and can have
need of special services independent of vocational considerations.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 2078.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2085.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2081.
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This shift in philosophy was also reflected in the deletion of the word
"vocational" from the title.117
The Act provided two limited antidiscrimination laws. 1 8 The
relative importance of these provisions to the drafters, however, is
reflected in the fact that both were included at the very end of the
bill under Title V-Miscellaneous." 9 The first provision, Section 503,
required employers involved in contracts with the federal govern-
ment in excess of $2,500 to take affirmative action to hire the handi-
capped. 20 Section 503 provided no private right of action, however,
and the federal courts have uniformly held that no such right will be
judicially implied.' 2' The only right created by Section 503 is the
right to file a complaint with the Department of Labor.' 22 Not sur-
prisingly, Section 503 has proved to be of limited value in protecting
the rights of the handicapped.
The second antidiscrimination provision, Section 504, is more
important and deserves to be quoted in full:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .
28
The presence of this section in the Rehabilitation Act is puzzling
because the Senate Report provides no discussion of this provision. 24
Certainly Section 504, and to a lesser extent Section 503, seem out
of place in a statute whose announced purpose was simply the exten-
sion of rehabilitative services to the severely disabled.
In 1974 Congress once again amended the Act.' Although the
117. Id. at 2076.
118. Id. at 2090.
119. Id. at 2121.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 503 (1973).
121. See Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1984);
Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1982); Fisher v. Tuscon,
663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981); Simon v. St. Louis County, 565 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981); Davis
v. United Air Lines, 662 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, 611 F.2d 1074 (5th
Cir. 1980); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals, 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Hoopes v. Equifax,
611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979); Fallett v. United States Postal Service, 644 F. Supp. 625 (N.D.
Tex. 1986); Thompson v. Springs Mills, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 651 (D.C.S.C. 1982).
122. Id. The only private right of action created by Section 503 is the right to compel
the Secretary of Labor to take action to investigate complaints of discrimination. Id.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1978).
124. S. REP., supra note 101.
125. S. REP. 93-1297, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., November 26, 1974 (reported in 4 U.S.
CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS § 6388). The Act was amended in 1978, but the amendments
are not relevant to the present topic.
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1974 law was concerned primarily with continued funding for
projects initiated the previous year, the 1974 amendments contained
a "technical and clarifying amendment" of crucial importance. 126
Section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defined a "handi-
capped individual" as "one whose physical or mental disability con-
stitutes for such an individual a substantial handicap to employment,
and who can be expected to benefit in terms of employability from
vocational rehabilitation services provided under title I or title
III.''12 Clearly, the 1973 definition revealed the traditional voca-
tional background of the federal program. The 1974 amendment
substituted the following definition: "Any person who A) has a phys-
ical or mental impairment which substantially limits such person's
functioning or one or more of such person's major life activities; B)
has a record of such an impairment; or C) is regarded as having
such an impairment."' 28
Several important features of the 1974 definition should be
noted. First, the government dispensed with any linkage between eli-
gibility for services and vocational potentials for the first time in the
history of federal rehabilitation legislation. Second, clause (C) pro-
vides protection in some cases for persons who are not handicapped
at all. '2 Further, the subsection is derived from title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and represents language borrowed from a body
of law that was previously considered irrelevant to the
handicapped. 30
This amended definition took the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 be-
yond its announced purpose of expressing federal concern for those
severely handicapped individuals with no vocational potential. By in-
cluding those regarded as impaired within its protection and by bor-
rowing civil rights language, Congress demonstrated a change in so-
cial philosophy towards the handicapped. It recognized the
handicapped as a minority whose civil rights were worthy of protec-
tion, instead of viewing them as objects of charity or a potential
126. Id.
127. S. REP., supra note 101.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1974).
129. Id.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). Pursuant to the 1974 definition, the Department of
Health and Human Services promulgated the following definition of "physical impairment:"
[A]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; car-
diovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; and
endocrine.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i).
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workforce. The introduction of Sections 503 and 504 into the law
forces society, at least in specific situations, to regard the handi-
capped in a new way. They now deserve certain special civil rights
because of their minority status.
VI. Judicial Interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act-School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline
In 1957, a schoolgirl by the name of Gene H. Arline was diag-
nosed as having tuberculosis. 31 After her illness went into remission,
she completed her education and, in 1966, was hired as an elemen-
tary school teacher in Nassau County, Florida.'32 She taught satis-
factorily for twelve years, until a series of three relapses caused the
Nassau County School Board to dismiss her at the end of the 1978-
1979 school year.'
Mrs. Arline brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida under Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 and the Civil Rights Act, claiming that her suscep-
tibility to tuberculosis was a handicap within the meaning of the Re-
habilitation Act.3 Arline pursued two theories at trial. Her initial
position was essentially a factual allegation that the risk of infection
to her students was so minimal that her dismissal was arbitrary and
unreasonable and, therefore, constituted discrimination. s5 Alterna-
tively, she argued that, even if her handicap prevented her from dis-
charging her duties as a teacher, the school board had discriminated
against her by failing to make a "reasonable accommodation" for
her condition, such as offering her an administrative position. 8 6
Following trial, the district court held in favor of the school dis-
trict on both handicap discrimination claims. 3 7 The trial court ruled
that Arline had failed to show that the school district was the benefi-
ciary of any "federal financial assistance" as required by Section
504. This ruling was based upon the fact that the federal grants re-
ceived by the district went into a general fund and did not specifi-
cally benefit Arline. Therefore, the Rehabilitation Act did not ap-
ply. 138 The court also ruled that, even if the Act applied, a




135. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 760-61 (11th Cir. 1985).
136. Id. at 764.
137. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985).
138. Id. at 760.
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contagious disease was not a "handicap" as defined by the Rehabili-
tation Act.
139
Arline appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
which reversed the judgment of the District Court in a careful and
well-reasoned decision.1 40 First, the court held that Section 504 ap-
plied to the case because the school district was indeed a recipient of
"federal financial assistance."'" The Eleventh Circuit followed the
decisions of other circuits that had considered the problem and ruled
that requiring the plaintiff to trace federal funds directly to her own
salary to invoke federal protections "impose[d] impossible bur-
dens." 42 The district received some federal funding; and even if it
could not be traced to the handicapped individual in question, it was
sufficient to bring the protections of the Act into play.'"
Reaching the merits of Mrs. Arline's discrimination claim, the
court held that there was no reason to think that Congress had in-
tended to exclude persons with contagious diseases from its protec-
tion of handicapped persons. The appeals court noted that the trial
court had created its own exception for contagious diseases in a law
that, on its face, provided no basis for such an exception. 44 The
court remanded the case for further hearings on whether the school
board could make a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff's
handicap.
1 45
The United States Supreme Court granted the school board's
petition for a writ of certiorari14 and heard oral argument on De-
cember 3, 1986.147 A group of congressmen filed an amicus brief
with leave of court and the consent of both parties. 1 8 Their argu-
ment supported the position of the Justice Department that the dis-
trict court had been correct in holding that a contagious disease was
not a handicap within the meaning of the Act.' 49 The stage was now
set for a pronouncement from the highest judicial authority in the
nation concerning the meaning and scope of the statutory protections
139. Id. at 761.
140. Id. at 754. The decision was dated September 30, 1985.
141. Id. at 760.
142. Id. at 763.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 761.
145. Id.
146. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Brief of Amicus Curie Congressmen Dannemeyer, Dornan, Hutto, Bentley, Han-
sen, Craig, Barton, and Senator Jesse Helms, School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 94
L.Ed.2d 307 (1987).
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against handicapped discrimination. On March 3, 1987, the Court
announced its decision affirming the Eleventh Circuit in all respects,
including the remand to the district court for further hearings. 5 '
Why did the Court accept the appeal? If the Court had re-
versed the Eleventh Circuit, the reason would be clear-review was
granted to correct a mistake by the lower court. But in this case, in
which the Court affirmed the lower court only three months after
argument, further inquiry is required.
Sometimes when the Supreme Court affirms, it does so on a dif-
ferent legal basis than the lower court's rationale. From a jurispru-
dential point of view this is almost as important as reversing the
lower court's decision. An affirmance on different grounds provides
guidance concerning exactly what the Supreme Court declares the
law to be, regardless of whether the prevailing party in the court
below happened to win on an erroneous view of the law. In Arline,




It does not appear that any other principle related to the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 needed to be interpreted in this case. The
Court had previously ruled that Section 504 of the Act created a
private right of action on behalf of handicapped individuals in Con-
solidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone.52 Nor did the facts of the
case involve an urgent problem of national importance; judged from
a national perspective, tuberculosis is no longer a major public
health concern.
The decision of the Supreme Court to review Arline really has
little or nothing to do with the facts of the case. Arline is a case
about AIDS that happened to involve an individual with tuberculo-
sis. AIDS is a major public health problem; tuberculosis is not. The
Court was eager to speak to the rights of AIDS patients under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but the justices knew that the pace of
the legal system meant that years would most likely elapse before a
case involving AIDS reached the Supreme Court. In Arline, the
Court took the opportunity to suggest what its view of AIDS will be
when that distant day arrives.
This interpretation of Arline is admittedly speculative. Whether
Arline accurately reflects the thinking of the Court on the rights of
AIDS victims will not be known for several years. In the meantime,
150. 94 L.Ed.2d at 322.
151. 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987).
152. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
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however, lower courts with AIDS cases will have to predict what the
Supreme Court's position will be. If those judges view Arline as an
AIDS case, the decision is the key not only to understanding how the
Supreme Court will ultimately rule on AIDS discrimination, but also
to how lower courts will rule in the meantime.
VII. Arline and the AIDS Victim's Rights
Reading the opinion of the United States Supreme Court along-
side that of the Eleventh Circuit is instructive. The focus of the lat-
ter, which consumed more than half of the opinion, was the question
of whether the school system was a recipient of "federal financial
assistance" as defined by the Rehabilitation Act.153 This focus was
proper in light of the district court's analysis of a highly technical
issue in Section 504 cases: whether handicapped individuals must
show that federal financial assistance actually contributed to the pro-
gram under which he or she was employed, or whether it is sufficient
to prove that the employer received federal financial assistance for
any program. As the Eleventh Circuit observed, the former approach
imposes an almost impossible accounting burden on the plaintiff to
trace federal funds and frustrates the clear intent of Congress.15"
By contrast, the United States Supreme Court did not address
this issue except for an ambiguous sentence in a footnote referring to
Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone,'55 a 1984 Supreme
Court decision whose meaning was itself disputed by the parties in
Arline.5 1 It is unfortunate that the Court chose not to address this
point by explaining its own 1984 decision. The omission is instruc-
tive, however, because it reveals that the attention of the Court was
directed elsewhere.
The Eleventh Circuit's discussion of whether Mrs. Arline was a
handicapped individual within the meaning of the Act is a model of
brevity and clarity. 157 The court pointed out that when Mrs. Arline
was suffering from an active outbreak of tuberculosis, she had "a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits . ... major
life activities" within the meaning of the statute. Even when her tu-
berculosis was in remission, she had "a record of such an impair-
ment;" 158 therefore, she was handicapped. In response to the district
153. 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985).
154. 772 F.2d at 762.
155. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
156. Id. at 764.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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court's determination that an impairment caused by a contagious
disease could not be a handicap, the court simply pointed out that
there was no basis in the statute for such a distinction:
Though the district court apparently thought it was illogical
to conclude that Congress would have placed contagious diseases
within the definition of "handicaps," there is no objective evi-
dence to support this conclusion. Neither the regulations nor the
statutory language give any indication that chronic contagious
diseases are to be excluded from the definition of "handicap."1 5 9
From a technical point of view, the above analysis was sufficient
to settle the point of law at issue; however, the Supreme Court did
not end its discussion there. The Court was dissatisfied with the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion in an important respect. In accordance
with traditional judicial doctrine, the circuit court had ruled based
only on the facts before it. Quite properly, the court had not specu-
lated on how an AIDS case would be decided. As previously indi-
cated, the Supreme Court's purpose in writing an opinion in this case
was to provide a vehicle to discuss precisely this subject.
After a brief review of the facts, the Supreme Court began its
legal analysis in an unremarkable fashion. It quoted the 1974 defini-
tion of "handicapped individual," as well as some secondary defini-
tions, and briefly reviewed the legislative history of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973.160 In its review of the facts, the Court specifically
noted that Mrs. Arline's 1957 hospitalization was sufficient to estab-
lish that she was a handicapped individual, without regard to her
condition in 1978 and 1979, because it left her with a record of im-
pairment."' The Court correctly recognized that this, in itself, was
sufficient to bring her within the statute.
16 2
Logically, the opinion should have ended at that point. The
Court had stated all the facts and law necessary to affirm the Elev-
enth Circuit. Instead, the Court set forth a six page adventure into
the realm of dicta. 63 Ostensibly, the Court was answering an argu-
ment of counsel for the school board that Mrs. Arline's record of
impairment was irrelevant because she had been dismissed "not be-
cause of her diminished physical capacities but because of the threat
that her relapses of tuberculosis posed to the health of others."16"
159. 94 L.Ed.2d at 317-22.
160. Id. at 317.
161. Id.
162. Id. Counsel for the school board conceded this point at oral argument.
163. Id. at 317-22.
164. Id. at 317.
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The sheer disingenuousness of the Court's implied assertion that it
was compelled to address a particular argument of counsel is breath-
taking. No American court at any level owes any explanation of why
it accepts or rejects the assertions of counsel.1"6 Further, the claim as
stated by the Court involved a factual and not a legal proposition.
The record indicated that Mrs. Arline had been fired because of the
"continued reoccurrence of tuberculosis." '166 Neither of the appellate
opinions indicates anything further. To claim that the record shows
Mrs. Arline was terminated because of the "threat her relapses of
tuberculosis posed to the health of others" is to state a falsehood, or,
at the very least, to make an unsubstantiated claim.
16
7
The reason the Court analyzed this problem at length most
likely has nothing to do with its merits. The importance of counsel's
claim is that it provided the Court with an opportunity to expound
upon the problem of persons who are not presently suffering from
any physical impairment but who are contagious-for example, per-
sons who are seropositive for AIDS. Such a discussion really has
nothing to do with Mrs. Arline since she was actually physically im-
paired and had a history of being impaired.1
6 8
After stating the problem-whether a person who is not physi-
cally impaired but who is the carrier of a contagious disease is pro-
tected by the Rehabilitation Act, the Court began the main part of
its analysis. The first response of the Court in footnote seven appears
at first glance to be a restatement of the obvious:
The United States argues that it is possible for a person to be
simply a carrier of a disease, that is, to be capable of spreading
a disease without having a "physical impairment" or suffering
from any other symptoms associated with the disease. The
United States contends that this is true in the case of some car-
riers of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) vi-
rus. From this premise the United States concludes that discrim-
ination solely on the basis of contagiousness is never
discrimination on the basis of a handicap. The argument is mis-
placed in this case, because the handicap here, tuberculosis,
gave rise to both a physical impairment and to contagiousness.
This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the
questions whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as
165. Rules of civil procedure often require a lower court to file a statement of its reasons
for a decision if the case is appealed.
166. 94 L.Ed.2d at 314.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 317.
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AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or
whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act. 69
This footnote is actually quite unnecessary to the decision. The
record showed incontestably that Mrs. Arline was impaired when she
was terminated in 1979 and that she had a record of previous im-
pairment. 17 Either would have been sufficient to establish her claim
to handicapped status.' 7 ' The Court's discussion of the hypothetical
problem of unimpaired carriers of a contagious disease had nothing
to do with the record. The Court was, in fact, responding to the posi-
tion of the government regarding the applicability of Section 504 to
individuals testing seropositive for the AIDS virus.
The legal rationale for the position of the Department of Justice
was carefully enunciated in a lengthy memorandum issued June 20,
1986, by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice to
the General Counsel for the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices.1 72 That memorandum also formed the basis of the amicus brief
filed by the congressmen . 73 Although a discussion of the govern-
ment's view is something of a digression, it is worthy of analysis. If
the Court's underlying objective was to address AIDS in the Arline
opinion, it is important to understand exactly what the Court was
reacting to and how it will react to similar arguments in the future.
The government's view was that persons with the AIDS virus
can be divided into two groups for Section 504 purposes: 1) those
with a physical impairment plus the ability to communicate the dis-
ease; and 2) those with no physical impairment but who are never-
theless contagious. 174 The former group is clearly covered by the Re-
habilitation Act since there is no legal distinction when the
impairment originates from a contagious disease. 17' According to the
government, however, the mere presence of the AIDS virus in the
body does not constitute an impairment that substantially limits any
major life activity. 7 6 If this view is accepted, it follows that the
169. Id. at 317 n.7.
170. Id. at 314.
171. Id.
172. Disabling Effects of AIDS Are Protected by Rehabilitation Act but Ability to
Transmit the Disease is Not, Memorandum by U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Counsel, for Ronald E. Robertson, General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, reported in CCH Employment Practices, New Developments, 5028 at 6054-72 [here-
inafter Disabling Effects of AIDS].
173. See Brief of Amicae, supra note 149.
174. Disabling Effects of AIDS, supra note 172.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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asymptomatic AIDS-infected individual is not handicapped and that
discrimination against him is not prohibited by Section 504. The
government took the position that the Act protects only against dis-
crimination based upon the individual's impairments, not against
fear that the individual's disease is contagious.17
Further, the government stated that:
[A] person capable of communicating the AIDS virus is not
"otherwise qualified" to participate in a covered program or ac-
tivity unless the risk that he poses to the health of other partici-
pants can be calculated with a high degree of medical certainty
and is low enough without "substantial modifications in the pro-
grams" to be disregarded." 8
The Court, of course, was not in a legal position to directly reject
this view since the case involved tuberculosis. The following lan-
guage of the Court, however, should give every encouragement to
those who believe that antidiscrimination protection should apply to
persons seropositive for AIDS but who have, as yet, no impairment:
Allowing discrimination based upon the contagious effects
of a physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic
purposes of Section 504, which is to ensure that handicapped
individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others. By amending the
definition of "handicapped individual" to include not only those
who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are re-
garded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially lim-
ited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that soci-
ety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment. Few aspects of a handicap give rise to
the same level of public fear and misapprehension as
contagiousness. 179
In light of the above quotation, it is helpful for this analysis to
further examine the most significant sentence in the entire opinion
the last sentence of footnote 7:
This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the
questions of whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as
AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or
whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 94 L.Ed.2d at 318-19.
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contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act. 80
This is more than a mere reservation of an issue that the Court did
not reach. This sentence, taken in context with the language con-
cerning the stigma of contagious diseases and public fear, indicates
not only how the Court may eventually rule on AIDS, but also what
its rationale may be.
The evidence suggests that the Court will rule that discrimina-
tion based upon seropositivity for the AIDS virus is prohibited by the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court will most likely decide, as suggested
in its footnote, that this condition is a physical impairment on at
least two grounds. First, the presence of the AIDS virus in the blood-
stream constitutes a present physical impairment of the immune sys-
tem. Second, the greatly decreased life expectancy of AIDS victims
constitutes a physical impairment of the body as a whole.18' If the
Court indeed rules in this fashion, it will not need to reach the ques-
tion of whether contagiousness alone is an impairment.
Even if the Court rules that seropositivity is an impairment, this
by no means ensures equal access to health care services for AIDS
patients. The Rehabilitation Act provides only limited assurances
that health care will be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. The
reasons for this are numerous. First, one of the two antidiscrimina-
tion provisions in the Act, Section 503, creates no private right of
action and is expressly limited to employment discrimination.18
The most significant limitation of the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of Section 504 is that it only applies, as far as the private sec-
tor is concerned, to programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance."8 " Federal regulations define financial assistance as:
Federal financial assistance means . . . any grant, loan, contract
(other than a procurement contract or a contract of insurance or
guaranty), 'or any other arrangement by which the Department
(of Health and Human Services) provides or otherwise makes
available assistance in the form of:
(1) Funds;
180. Id. at 317 n.7.
181. Id. These possible rationales are specifically raised by the Court; however, other
arguments also exist. For example, the restrictions on one's sexual lifestyle if one is seroposi-
tive constitute an impairment of an important life function. The Court could reject the govern-
ment's view and hold that it is not meaningful to distinguish between discrimination based on
handicap and discrimination based on fear of contagion and hold that seropositive persons are
perceived as impaired. Conversation with representatives of the New York American Civil
Liberties Union (Dec. 18, 1987).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 503 (1974).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1974).
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(2) Services of Federal personnel;
(3) Real or personal property or any interest or use of
such property, including:
(i) Transfer or leases of such property for less than fair
market value or for reduced consideration; and
(ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of
such property if the federal share of its fair market
value is not returned o the federal government.""
Clearly most hospitals and many nursing homes will be subject
to the Act, but it is unlikely that a hospital will establish a policy
discriminating against patients on the basis of AIDS.185 The poten-
tial problem lies with individual health care practitioners--doctors,
dentists, physical therapists, nurse practitioners, and others acting
independent of the hospital setting. The Act will usually not apply to
them because rarely do they receive federal financial assistance.
Thus, even if the Supreme Court rules in favor of AIDS victims, the
victory will hardly be a complete one. A gap will exist in precisely
the area where protection is needed most.
VIII. Additional Statutory Sources of Legal Rights for AIDS
Victims
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is not the only Federal law that
is relevant to the rights of AIDS victims. A number of federal courts
have considered handicap discrimination challenges brought under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides that
"no person acting under color of state law shall deprive another of
any right guaranteed under the United States Constitution without
due process of law." 186 Most of these courts have concluded that
Section 1983 does not create a private right" of action for handi-
capped discrimination apart from such rights as they exist under
Section 504.187 Further, even if such a right was judicially recog-
nized, it would have a more limited application than Section 504.
For discrimination under the Civil Rights Act to be actionable, it
must occur "under color of state law," that is, the discrimination
must take place either by state officials or in conspiracy with
184. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving
or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. 84.3(h) (1986).
185. Medicare and Medicaide payments made to these institutions would constitute fed-
eral financial assistance.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
187. See Annot., 60 A.L.R. FED 312.
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them. 188 This means that even if a cause of action exists under Sec-
tion 1983 for refusing health care, it only applies to state hospitals
which are probably within the scope of Section 504 anyway. 89
Purely private discrimination would not be affected.
Almost every state, the District of Columbia, and most large
cities have some form of statutory protection against discrimina-
tion.190 These protections vary greatly from forum to forum. A few
states have no general antidiscrimination statute at all. 9' Some of
these states have, instead, prohibited discrimination by executive or-
der when the state itself is involved.' 92 Further, not all of the states
with antidiscrimination laws include handicapped persons as a pro-
tected class.' 3 Even in states that protect persons with physical
problems, the scope of protection varies considerably. 94 Some states,
such as Pennsylvania, use the broad definition of "handicapped per-
son" contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.15 Others use a
narrower definition, and some speak in terms of "disabled persons,"
an even more restrictive view."" Although most of these laws apply
to the private sector, some apply only to the state.' 97
In light of the diversity of these statutory protections, it is
heartening that every relevant ruling by a state or city human rela-
tions commission has been in favor of AIDS victims. Most were re-
ported even before the decision in Arline."' Now that the Supreme
188. See. e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kresse & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1974).
190. These laws are usually titled "Human Rights Act," "Human Relations Act,"
"Civil Rights Act," "Equal Pay Act," "Fair Practice Act," or "Fair Employment and Housing
Act."
191. Neither Idaho nor Delaware afford any general statutory protection to the handi-
capped; however, Idaho creates a right of equal access for the disabled to public facilities and
Delaware prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in public employment by executive
order. Georgia and Kentucky specifically exclude communicable diseases from their definitions
of "handicap;" however, Georgia takes the position that, since AIDS does not spread by casual
contact, it is not a communicable disease. Franks, AIDS As a Physical Handicap Under State
Law, unpublished memorandum, May 18, 1987 (available from Employment Law Center of




195. The states that have adopted the federal definition are California, Colorado, Ha-
waii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah (by court decision), Vermont, and West
Virginia. Id.
196. The states that use "disabled" instead of "handicapped" are Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, and Texas ("crippled"). However, the differ-
ence in terminology does not appear to make a significant difference in practice. Id.
197. The statutes in Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi only apply to the state. Id. As
noted above, Delaware has no statute at all. See supra note 191.
198. To date, favorable rulings have been made in California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire,
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Court has indicated its sympathy for AIDS victims, it is fair to as-
sume that this trend will continue. As important as these rulings
may be in protecting certain rights of AIDS victims, however, they
have little effect upon the problem of obtaining medical treatment.
The problem with relying on state human relations acts to as-
sure access to medical care for AIDS patients is threefold. First, un-
less the statute is phrased with particularity to protect against re-
fusal to provide medical services, such discrimination will not be
covered. Second, depending upon the wording of the law, it may not
apply to the acts of individual physicians. Third, even if statutes are
specifically drafted to address this problem, the laws apply only on a
state level. Thus, the battle would have to be fought fifty times to
guarantee equal treatment of all the afflicted.
IX. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is a fairly typical
human relations statute.199 As enacted in 1955, it provided protec-
tion only against discrimination based on "race, color, religious
creed, ancestry, age or national origin." 00 The present statute is
considerably broader:
The opportunity for an individual to obtain employment for
which he is qualified, and to obtain all the accommodations, ad-
vantages, facilities and privileges of any public accommodation
and of housing accommodation and commercial property with-
out discrimination because of race, color, religious creed, ances-
try, handicap or disability, age, sex, national origin, the use of a
guide or support animal because of blindness, deafness or physi-
cal handicap of the user or because the user is a handler or
trainer of support or guide animals is hereby recognized as. and
declared to be a civil right which shall be enforceable as set
forth in this act.2 01
The next section of the Act, entitled Unlawful Discriminatory Prac-
tices, elaborately details the specific statutory protections. 2
The Human Relations Act is reassuring because of its sheer
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. Interestingly, the only
ruling involving an actual case was in California. The decisions in the other states were based
on rulings by the human relations agency. Employment Law Reporter (CCH).
199. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 951 (1985).
200. Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, No. 222.
201. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 952 (1985).
202. Id. at § 953.
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bulk and details. Unfortunately, however, none of the protections are
of assistance to the AIDS victim needing medical attention. Even
though it has been extensively amended, the Act still shows its ori-
gins as an anti-employment discrimination statute. The Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, like all similar laws, does not create a genera-
lized civil right to be free of discrimination based upon race, sex,
age, handicap, or other criteria. Certain forms of discrimination such
as employment, housing, and lending are prohibited, but an individ-
ual may legally discriminate based on anything not specifically men-
tioned in the statute. 08 Any statute that fails to employ a broad
clause forbidding the refusal to provide services otherwise available
to the general public based upon membership in a protected class
will provide no protection for AIDS victims. Nothing in the Pennsyl-
vania law prohibits a physician from discriminating against AIDS
victims by refusing to provide them with medical services.Z04
The situation in Pennsylvania is hardly unique. A review of the
human relations laws of ten of the most populous states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia failed to identify a statute that would protect an
AIDS victim from the refusal of a private physician to provide treat-
ment.20 5 By executive order, Massachusetts prohibits state-licensed
institutions and doctors employed at such institutions from withhold-
ing services from handicapped persons. 20 6 Even this law, however,
would fail to reach physicians in private practice.10 7
In a complex industrialized society, many opportunities for dis-
crimination exist. The drafters of the original Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act of 1955 had very specific forms of discrimination in
mind and protected only certain classes of persons. Although the
protected classes have been enlarged considerably, the Act has never
escaped its original limited notion of what rights are protected.
Therefore, although recognition of AIDS as a handicap under a par-
ticular state's human relations law is certainly an important step for-
ward, it will not provide AIDS victims with a right to medical care.
X. Conclusion
It is difficult to contemplate the legal status of AIDS victims
without a sense of irony. Viewing the possibility of treatment refusal
203. Id. at § 951.
204. Id.
205. The states reviewed were California, Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.
206. Article VIll, Governor's Code of Fair Practices.
207. Id.
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as a civil rights problem, the natural response is a call for specific
federal legislation, as was the case for blacks, religious and ethnic
minorities, and women. This is especially true because the traditional
tools of the civil rights advocate - state human rights laws and the
Federal Civil Rights Acts - are largely unhelpful. The Arline deci-
sion, however, may solve the problem of establishing a right to treat-
ment for AIDS victims from most institutional caregivers through
application of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The American Medi-
cal Association, an organization not intimately involved in the civil
rights struggle, has already asserted its ethical and legal leadership
on a national level. The problem of ensuring that individual physi-
cians continue to treat, however, is one of enforcement and monitor-
ing on a local and state basis. Certainly there will be local variations
from the AMA standards and even some resistance, but the AMA's
stance provides advocates for AIDS patients with a social and pro-
fessional legitimacy that could not have been provided by any other
group.
AIDS presents society with challenges unknown since the influ-
enza epidemic of 1918-1919. Both as individuals and as a whole, we
must strive to contain our fears and meet the manifold demands this
disease places upon us. It is comforting to think that our ability as a
society to meet the needs of the victims has been bolstered by the
American Medical Association and a statute enacted long before
AIDS was diagnosed.
